2011 International Conference on Alternative Energy in Developing Countries and Emerging Economies
- 272 -
Fig. 2. Linear Diagram of RBTS.
In fact, each DGENCO solves its problem using (2) for
optimizing its own benefit in a dynamic game applying
CPLEX under GAMS based programming software. First
numerical results for RBTS are shown in Table V. The
basic strategy is offered by DGENCOs to the ISO. ISO
notifies incentives/disincentives for the strategy using
MCS for reliability assessment and by considering 5%
weekly load duration curve uncertainty. ISO calculates
weekly EENS and IEAR indices by MCS technique that
shows the weekly acceptable EENS values for ISO. Fig. 3
presents EENS values for ISO important reliability weeks
which calculated by Monte Carlo simulation technique.
TABLE
I
5%
LOAD UNCERTAINTY DATA
Probability
Demand
(MW) IEEE RTS
Demand
(MW) RBTS
Standard
Deviation
0.006
2422.5
157.25
-3
0.061
2565
166.5
-2
0.242
2707.5
175.75
-1
0.382
2850
185
0
0.242
2992.5
194.25
1
0.061
3135
203.5
2
0.006
3277.5
212.75
3
TABLE
II
R
BTS GENERATING UNITS DATA
.
Maintenance Duration
FOR
P
max
(MW)
Numbers
DGENCO-1
2 Weeks
0.02
40
1
2 Weeks
0.015
20
2
2 Weeks
0.015
20
3
2 Weeks
0.015
20
4
2 Weeks
0.015
20
5
2 Weeks
0.01
5
6
2 Weeks
0.01
5
7
DGENCO-2
2 Weeks
0.03
40
8
2 Weeks
0.03
40
9
2 Weeks
0.025
20
10
2 Weeks
0.02
10
11
TABLE
III
W
EEKLY PEAK DEMAND INFORMATION FOR RBTS
Demand(MW)
No.
Demand(MW)
No.
Demand(MW)
No.
144
37
161
19
159
1
129
38
163
20
167
2
134
39
158
21
162
3
134
40
150
22
154
4
137
41
167
23
163
5
138
42
164
24
156
6
148
43
166
25
154
7
163
44
159
26
149
8
164
45
140
27
137
9
168
46
151
28
136
10
174
47
148
29
132
11
165
48
163
30
134
12
174
49
134
31
130
13
179
50
144
32
139
14
185
51
148
33
133
15
176
52
135
34
148
16
134
35
139
17
130
36
155
18
TABLE
IV
W
EEKLY PRICE
($/
MWH
)
FOR RBTS AND IEEE RTS
Price
($/MWh)
No.
Price
($/MWh)
No.
Price
($/MWh)
No.
51
37
57
19
57
1
46
38
58
20
59
2
48
39
57
21
58
3
48
40
54
22
55
4
49
41
59
23
58
5
49
42
59
24
56
6
53
43
59
25
55
7
58
44
57
26
53
8
58
45
50
27
49
9
60
46
54
28
49
10
62
47
53
29
47
11
59
48
58
30
48
12
62
49
48
31
46
13
64
50
51
32
50
14
66
51
53
33
48
15
63
52
48
34
53
16
48
35
50
17
47
36
55
18
Moreover, ISO obtained the incentives/disincentives
using (6), (7) & (8) for the considered strategy. Table VI
represents the incentives/disincentives calculations for
ISO important weeks that reliability risk of system
increases during these weeks. Then, ISO notifies the
incentives/disincentives to the DGENCOs. Therefore,
DGENCOs re-calculate their payoffs in DRMM by (9)
and find the final Nash strategy. Table VII shows the
acceptable strategy for ISO and DGENCOs.
As a result, DGENCO-1 and DGENCO-2 have
obtained 53071556 $ & 44722591$ respectively as their
payoff by participating in both Wholesale and
Maintenance Market. In final round, DGENCOs accept
the penalties of weeks 12 & 13. Then they accept the
incentives of weeks 35, 36, 38, 39 & finally they accept
to pay 42543$ to ISO as penalty of week 51.
As Table VII shows, in this strategy maintenance
weeks are weeks that the price and the load values are
lower in comparison with other weeks and IEAR is
acceptable for the whole 52 weeks.
